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Historians of the future will no doubt focus on the transformative role of Internet-based communications as they have changed 
human interaction in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  The introduction of modern postal services in Japan and 
elsewhere in the nineteenth century produced effects no less profound: citizens were connected to each other and their 
governments by reliable and relatively speedy delivery of letters, newspapers, and parcels.  Japan’s postal system was a great 
success, but the communications practices of the Japanese prior to the establishment of the post played an important role in that 
success.  Courier services—the so-called hikyakuya—of the early modern period survived and ultimately became today’s Nippon 
Tsūun (Nittsū), a global logistical corporation.  This article surveys the development of early modern Japanese communications, 
demonstrating the indispensible role that Nittsū’s company history plays in understanding that development. 
 
 
 
oward the end of Shimazaki Tōson’s historical novel, Before the Dawn (Yoake mae), the protagonist 
Aoyama Hanzō, former headman of a post station during the late Tokugawa period ponders the future. 
The narrator informs the reader of Hanzō’s concerns as a new, centralizing state begins to take shape: 
Since the beginning of Meiji, everyone in the country had been confronted with an 
overwhelming pressure to change everything, from the direction of scholarly inquiry to the last 
detail of customary behavior. Hanzō was acutely aware of this.  Yet there was one thing that 
seemed incontrovertible to him out of his experience as head of the Magome post station. This was 
that of all the coming changes, the ones in transportation and communication would result in the 
most deep-rooted and substantial transformations of society.  Their effects would be like those of 
water, the weakest and most subtle, but in the end the most powerful of all the agents of change.  
Such changes affected all, high and low, rich and poor. They determined the success or failure of 
human society. They wove the fabric of history, and changed the maps. And they led to the 
exchange of all kinds of goods.1 
 
                                                            
1 Shimazaki Tōson, Before the Dawn, William Naff, trans. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 641. 
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Shimazaki wrote Yoake mae in the age of airplanes, automobiles, and telecommunications and well 
understood what the real Hanzō of early Meiji could not have:  the next century and a half would bring changes in 
communications that have profoundly altered human societies. One of the first of these transformations was in 
government-operated posts. Of the American postal system, historian Richard John writes that it “spurred a 
communications revolution that was as profound in its consequences for American public life as the subsequent 
revolutions that have come to be associated with the telegraph, the telephone, and the computer.”2  John’s 
characterization is no less applicable to the case of Japan. This study looks not to the full development of Japan’s 
national post, but rather to its antecedent systems of overland communication. Its purpose is to demonstrate the 
singular importance of communications practices during the Tokugawa period to the rapid development of the Meiji 
post. Without the preexisting systems of public and private communications, the infrastructure upon which they 
operated, and the institutional knowledge of thousands of “Hanzōs” as the first local postmasters, it is unlikely that 
the Meiji postal system could have been established as quickly and efficiently. 
 
Forced Cooperat ion:  The Mei j i  Post  and Tradi t ional  Courier  Companies  
 Japan inaugurated a national postal system on 3.1.1871 (April 20), offering service between 
Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. By the end of 1871 there were 180 post and handling offices and by 1874 the number had 
grown to 3,245. In those years the volume of items handled expanded dramatically, growing from almost 565,000 
items to nearly 20 million. Given these striking figures—numbers that, with a few exceptions, only increased over 
the next 120 years—it seems clear that the post had achieved its goals of providing a reliable, inexpensive service 
that would, in contrast to the communications of the preceding era, tie the “remote points” of the country together so 
that the “state of affairs throughout the country be ascertained with ease and quickness, so that all classes may be 
able to have their letters forwarded with the greatest possible expedition.”3 
 Success was not a given. In its first years the new national postal system in fact had to compete 
with the Edo-era private courier companies (hikyakuya) that had survived into the Meiji period. To ensure its 
growth, Maejima Hisoka, the driving spirit behind Japan’s new postal system, took initial steps to bring the private 
couriers under state control in 1871, and finally, having achieved that aim, to ban any private carriage of mail in 
1873.4 The largest of the Edo-era courier companies vigorously defended their businesses; ultimately, though, 
through Maejima’s direction they played an instrumental role in the early growth of Japan’s post through their 
conversion to a unified corporation whose main role was as a subcontractor to the government, providing carriage of 
letters and parcels between distribution points. Naturally, then, one cannot account for the success of the Meiji post 
without some understanding of these companies, their origins, and the nature of communications in the Edo period. 
 It is tempting to claim today’s Nittsū, as the global logistics corporation Nippon Tsūun Kabushiki 
Kaisha is now commonly rendered, as a lineal descendant of the Riku’un Moto Gaisha, the first Meiji company 
formed of the surviving major Edo-era couriers. Indeed, that is the narrative development suggested by Nittsū’s 
company history. But the story is not so simple. Nittsū’s company history makes clear that it was officially 
established as Nippon Tsūun Kabushiki Kaisha in 1937 as government-directed, semi-private company under the 
constraints of war, becoming a fully private company in 1949. This is a demarcation from the 1870s as the Riku’un 
                                                            
2 Richard R. John, Spreading the News: the American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), vii. 
3 Postal figures are from Yabuuchi Yoshikiko, Nihon yūbin hattatsu shi (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2000), 223; announcement of goals of new postal 
service from “A Japanese Post Office,” The Japan Weekly Mail, 29 April 1871. 
4 Shashi: Nippon Tsūun Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo: Nippon Tsūun Kabushiki Kaisha, 1962), 127-129.  Hereafter, Shashi. 
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Moto Gaisha transformed into the Naikoku Tsūun Kaisha in 1875. This company merged with several others in 
1928 to become Kokusai Tsūun Kabushiki Kaisha.5   
 The formation of the Riku’un Moto Gaisha is tied to the leadership of the merchant courier 
(hikyakuya), Izumiya. By the end of the Edo period, there were but five large private courier companies remaining in 
Edo.6  Perhaps because Izumiya’s owner, Yoshimura Jinbei, had already served the Meiji government as an official 
in a fledgling office of commerce (shōhō kaisho) in 1869, he and his chief managing officer, Sasaki Sōsuke, were 
approached by Maejima Hisoka in order to convince their fellow private couriers that they would do better to 
cooperate with the new postal system than to challenge the government for their rights to continue the private 
conduct of mails.7 And so, Izumiya’s Yoshimura Jinbei and Sasaki Sōsuke took the lead in reorganizing the 
couriers—four other great hikyakuya companies as well as multiple affiliated companies in Kyoto and Osaka—into 
a subcontracting company for the Meiji government postal service. 
 
Nippon Ts un Kabushiki Kaisha’s Company History as Documentary Source 
 One purpose of this article is to reveal the value of Nittsū’s company history in documenting the 
private couriers. The 1,094-page shashi of Nittsū devotes over 130 pages to the Tokugawa and early-Meiji history 
of the private couriers. Uno Shūhei, the author of the chapter on the era of the hikyaku, draws on multiple sources, 
many of which are in the archives of Nittsū and the archives of the former Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. Kodama Kōta subsequently collected some of these records from other important transporters 
used in Nittsū’s shashi as part of a multi-volume series on early modern Japanese communications.8  An important 
source for government documents used by Uno is the reference on pre-Meiji transportation Dai Nippon Teikoku 
ekitei shikō.9 Eschewing footnotes as is often Japanese practice, Uno nonetheless thoroughly documents his 
sources in the body of the text.  As the citations in the following summary of Edo-era communications will show, 
Nittsū’s shashi is an indispensible reference. Because it is meant to connect Nittsū with the past, it focuses almost 
entirely on the development of courier companies in the largest cities, only hinting at the range of communications 
structures that developed in other parts of Japan. Nonetheless, for the historian of early modern Japan, it greatly 
enriches our understanding of the interplay between official and private affairs, the dynamism of Japanese society, 
and the importance of long-distance communications in the management of government, business, and private 
matters.  
 This article also introduces the hikyakuya (sometimes hikyaku), the array of organizations responsible for 
conducting overland communications, both public and private, in Tokugawa Japan. Originating in the demand for 
regularized information exchange among the samurai class early in the era, the hikyaku couriers soon began to 
carry letters, goods, and cash between the cities of Kyoto, Osaka, and Edo. The networks created by these 
companies (and in some cases government-operated organizations) grew with the commercial economy and came 
to cover most of Japan. Thus, while there was no “national” network, there was a series of networks that could be 
linked by cooperating transport companies as circumstances demanded. In the political and economic environment 
of Tokugawa Japan, the success and survival of hikyaku companies was never a given. They operated under the 
constraints of a transport infrastructure created first and foremost to meet the needs of the governing military class. 
They often faced challenges from post station officials and workers, bandits who preyed on travelers, inclement 
                                                            
5 Shashi, 1-3. 
6 Ibid., 128. 
7 Yūseishō, Yūsei hyakunenshi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunhan, 1971), 96-97. 
8 Kodama Kōta,ed., Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, Hikyaku kankei shiryō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1974). 
9 Aoe Shū, ed., Dai Nippon Teikoku ekitei shikō. First edition 1882. 
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weather, and the growing numbers of people traveling the roads, stretching the resources of the post stations and 
ferries that provided for them. Finally, the courier companies struggled to balance the search for profit with the 
need to cooperate with peer organizations (for a time as a trade guild) so that they could effectively negotiate with 
government officials and post station agents to overcome the various challenges to their businesses. As a side effect 
of this cooperation, attempts by rivals or upstarts to innovate through streamlined relay practices were squelched as 
the dominant businesses jealously guarded the clientele that each had developed and nurtured. The largest of these 
companies survived into the Meiji era and consolidated to form an organization that ultimately became Nippon 
Tsūun, a twenty-first century global logistics power. Such a development strongly implies the importance of 
communications for Edo-period society and the role that those involved in it played in laying the stage for Japan’s 
modern communications in the Meiji era and beyond. 
 
Transport Systems in Tokugawa Japan 
  Before examining the types of courier arrangements a brief introduction of the general contours of 
the transport infrastructure, both overland and maritime, will aid in placing the couriers within the larger movement 
of people and goods. The overland transport infrastructure of the Tokugawa period was based on the five main 
highways. Two highways joined Edo to the Kyoto-Osaka region. The Tōkaidō extended from Edo to Osaka. It 
consisted of 58 post stations, six sea crossings and two river crossings. The Nakasendō, stretching from Edo through 
central Japan to Kyoto, had a total of 79 stations. Other roads included the Ōshū and Nikkō roads extending north 
from Edo, and the Kōshū highway, which connected Edo to the Nakasendō.10 These main highways were connected 
by many auxiliary roads too numerous to name. The post stations on the highways were allowed tax exemptions and 
given stipends to offset costs of aiding transporters and travelers. Travelers were required to transfer their cargo at 
each station as a means both of ensuring business at each station and as a way to alleviate physical burdens on 
horses and soldiers.11  
        The bulk of cargo that moved between regions of Tokugawa Japan was not carried overland, but rather 
was shipped by sea. The principal freight carried by boats was tax rice, so Osaka became an important shipping hub 
with a major part of shipping occurring between Osaka and Edo. The Inland Sea was long an important shipping 
corridor, connecting Osaka to Kyūshū and from there up the western coast to Hokkaidō.  Edo was also linked to the 
Tōhoku region by shipping along the east and northeastern coasts.12 Boats carried more than rice, of course. They 
carried items such as soybeans, sake, soy sauce, vinegar, dried fish fertilizer, salt, lumber, tatami mats, and many 
other goods for sale.13 But boats were naturally subject to capsizing in storms, and water damage to goods was a 
constant concern, as was timeliness of shipments. For these reasons, overland transport was preferred for the 
movement of such things as textiles, cash, and written communications. Transport of these types of goods, and 
letters in particular, was the business of the hikyaku couriers.  
  
                                                            
10 Maruyama Yasunari, “Gokaidō to wakikaidō,” in Nihon kōtsūshi ed. Kodama Kōta (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 199. 
11 Constantine Vaporis, “Post Station and Assisting Villages: Corvée Labor and Peasant Contention,” Monumenta Nipponica, 4 (Winter, 1986): 
378-379. 
12 Robert G. Flersham, “Some Aspects of Japan Sea Shipping and Trade in the Tokugawa Period, 1603-1867,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 110, no. 3 (June 1966): 182. 
13 Watanabe Nobuo, “Kaijō kōtsū,” in Nihon kōtsūshi ed. Kodama Kōta (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 235. 
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Types of Hikyaku 
 Japanese scholars usually identify three general categories of hikyaku courier operations.14  Tsugi-
bikyaku, or “shogunal couriers,” refers to the couriers and the relay system of which they were a part that was 
operated by the Tokugawa bakufu authorities to communicate official business. Daimyō hikyaku, or “daimyo 
couriers” similarly refers to both couriers and the systems set in place by the largest domains to conduct 
communications between the domain and official residences in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto. Machi-bikyaku—“merchant 
couriers”—refers to all of the private enterprises that handled letters and freight as their principle business. Among 
these, the sando-bikyaku (“thrice-monthly”) companies of Osaka, the Kyoto junban hikyaku (“rotating dispatch”) 
companies, and the Edo jō-bikyaku (“designated couriers”) companies dominated communications between the three 
major cities as well as providing connections as far north as Hakodate and as far south as Nagasaki. In addition, 
there were transport companies that were identified with a particular commercial product, such as the chijimi 
hikyaku of the Echigo region whose main role was to provide transport for crepe textile merchants between Echigo 
in the northwest and Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka. The kome hikyaku of Osaka specialized in the publication and 
distribution of reports on the rice market. These companies were similar in character to the merchant couriers 
(machi-bikyaku) but more specialized in clientele and services provided. Another specialized service was performed 
by companies belonging to the guild known as the mukumi hikyaku, so called for attachment of these houses to one 
of six Edo associations. These companies specialized in transport for the daimyō retinue traveling between the home 
domain and Edo as part of the sankin kōtai system of forced residency in Edo.15 
 
Shogunal Couriers 
       The bakufu’s official transport service had its roots in practices developed in the course of the Warring 
States Period (1467-1568). The various lords who had consolidated control over domains had instituted internal 
communications systems. These were further absorbed into semi-national systems with the rise to power of 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his lieutenant Tokugawa Ieyasu.  By the time Tokugawa Ieyasu’s forces vanquished its 
rivals at Sekigahara in 1600, there was already in place a system of transfer stations for information and material 
from Edo to the Kansai region (Osaka and Kyoto) and from the Kansai further south to Nagasaki.16 The Tokugawa 
government inherited this structure and refined it over the course of the seventeenth century. 
         While occasionally carrying small cargo, the shogunal courier’s main function was to transmit the 
documents of the bakufu senior councilors (rōjū), the Kyoto shoshidai (bakufu deputy), the offices of Osaka and 
Nijō castles—in short, all of the bakufu offices including intendant offices used this official service for 
communications with Edo.17  Documents were delivered to the tenmajo transport office in a letterbox (jō-bako); the 
tenmajo runners carried them to the first station in Edo, Shinagawa. From there, in principle, two runners 
accompanied the box, alternating between the tasks of carrying the box and running ahead to clear the road. At night 
                                                            
14 Fujimura Junichirō, “Tsūshin to hikyaku,” in Taikei Nihonshi sōsho v. 24, Kōtsū, ed. Kodama Kōta  (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1970), 
188-192.  Also, Fujimura Junichirō, “Jōhō dentatsusha: hikyaku no katsudō,” in Nihon no Kinsei, v. 6, Jōhō to kōtsū, ed. Maruyama Yasunari, 
(Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1992). 
15 Tokugawa leaders developed a formalized system by which daimyo alternated attendance between their home domain and Edo.  The system 
was meant to force daimyo to demonstrate loyalty to the shogun, but it also caused daimyo to expend enormous resources on the transport of their 
retinues.  
16 Shashi, 30-32. 
17 Fujimura Junichirō, “Tsūshin to hikyaku,” 289-290; and Yūseishō, Yūsei hyakunenshi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1971), 17. 
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one runner carried a lantern on a pole to help negotiate the road. Records of two stations, Hodogaya near Edo and 
Moriguchi near Osaka, indicate that letterboxes were often carried by four men, and freight by as many as six.18 
        Each station was to have a tenma yaku or tonya (official overseeing provision of carriers and horses, 
sometimes read as toiya) and healthy men on duty. By 1640, stations on the Tōkaidō were required to keep 100 men 
and 100 horses on duty; stations on the Nakasendō and Mino highway, 50 each; and stations on Nikkō, Kōshū, and 
Ōshū, highways 25 men and horses.19 The tonya was often the village headman and was always from an elite 
family.20 At the beginning of the Tokugawa period each station was to receive 50 bales (hyō) of rice to subsidize the 
duty-free operation.21 In practice, stations received different allotments depending on distance to the next transfer 
and the difficulty of the terrain. For example, Odawara station, lying at the base of the mountains leading west to 
Hakone, received about eighty-six koku while Shōno and Ishigakushi stations received just over twelve koku.22 In 
addition, station officials received tax exemptions for their service. Stations found it difficult or impossible to meet 
their obligations, however, and by the 1630’s neighboring villages were being required to provide supplemental 
horses and men to the post stations. In 1694, these practices were systematized and such villages officially 
designated as “assisting” villages.23  
         Shogunal couriers were given the highest priority on the roads and in the stations.  Kachi metsuke, 
lower bakufu officers with police functions, investigated any delays or mishandling of these communications.24 
Investigations were thorough and punishments could be harsh. In 1686 the Hodogaya transport agent was punished 
by banishment from within 20 ri of Edo (one ri was approximately four kilometers) and the loss of his possessions 
for incorrectly forwarding a single shipment from the Kyoto deputy (shoshidai) to the Edo senior councilors in two 
shipments.  In 1748, when the Moriguchi station agent failed to attach an explanatory memo to a delayed post, its 
records for the previous ten years were audited in an investigation that lasted eight months.25 
        It is estimated that the system of stations, post officials, and runners that constituted the Shogunal 
courier system along the Tōkaidō highway was in place by 1632 or 1633 (Kan’ei 9, 10).26 In 1696 the tenmajo 
transport office reported to the Edo city commissioner (machi bugyō) that express deliveries between Edo and Kyoto 
took sixty-four to sixty-six hours, or just under three days and that special express deliveries had been made in sixty 
hours. Another report only four years later indicated that express mail required eighty-two hours (about three and a 
half days), and normal mail was delivered in ninety hours (just under four days). However, a special class (mukoku, 
or “no time”) could be delivered in as little as fifty-six hours (just over two days). By 1763 time for the delivery of 
official documents from Kyoto to Edo were set at five days for normal mail, four days for express, and sixty-eight 
hours for special express mail.27  Of course, the above delivery times were based on optimal conditions.       
  
                                                            
18 Yabuuchi Yoshihiko, Nihon yūbin sōgyōshi: hikyaku kara yūbin e, (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1975), 30-31.  Yabuuchi does not speculate on the 
discrepancy, only noting that no documents have been found to explain the need for more than two runners.  It may have been for security 
purposes as the roads east of Hakone and around Moriguchi were notorious for bands of thieves. 
19 Kodama Kōta, Shukueki, (Tokyo: Shinshusha, 1963), 45-46. 
20 Yūsei hyakunenshi, 16-17. 
21 Shashi, 31.  According to Yabuuchi, stations might be paid in rice or cash, or a combination of the both, 27. 
22 Yabuuchi, Nihon yūbin sōgyōshi: hikyaku kara yūbin e, 27.  Koku was a standard rice measurement, approximately five bushels. 
23 Vaporis, “Post Station and Assisting Villages: Corvée Labor and Peasant Contention,” 384. 
24 Yūsei hyakunenshi, 17. 
25 Yabuuchi, 30. 
26 Shashi, 32. 
27 Yūsei hyakunenshi, 17-18. 
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Daimyo ̄ Couriers 
   Each domain had in place its own internal system of communications.28 In addition, many 
domains connected their internal communications to Edo by placing their own runners at points along the main 
highways. These latter were known generally as daimyō hikyaku and sometimes specifically as shichi-ri hikyaku.   
         The logistics of alternate attendance in Edo, the need to convert tax rice to cash in Osaka, and 
relations with the Imperial Court in Kyoto required many domains to maintain residences and offices in the three 
major cities. For efficient governance, domain leaders needed ready access to information from these three great 
urban centers; they also needed to convey information within the domain itself. Tottori domain, for example, 
operated a courier system placing an officer in charge of communications both in Tottori and in Edo (hikyaku 
gashira). While these operated for the purpose of carrying official letters, domain samurai were allowed to post 
private letters into official boxes and could expect their letters to reach home in about ten days.  The system seems 
to have been widely used, for the domain frequently issued orders that all communications be written on the lightest 
paper available and that only official letters would be accepted. Tottori domain also sent low-ranking samurai 
messengers at intervals en route during the sankin kōtai procession to all of its domainal offices and residences to 
apprise them of the daimyo’s safety.29 Tottori maintained an extensive communications system of village relays 
(mura okuri) within the domain as well. The couriers of this system were commoners performing corvée. By 1856 
there were relay stations set up throughout the domain, insuring almost daily communications between the castle 
town and other domain cities and villages.30 
        The most famous of the daimyo hikyaku were the “seven-ri” couriers (shichi-ri hikyaku) of Owari and 
Kii domains (though others such as Mito, Echizen, Izumo, Himeji, Tsuyama, Takamatsu, and Kawagoe also 
maintained similar systems at various times).31 The term shichi-ri hikyaku is often thought to refer to the distance 
between transfer stations on the routes set up—approximately one every seven ri.  In fact, the eighteen transfer 
stations of Owari, for example, were placed on average at just over four ri  (that is, about every ten miles).32  The 
couriers were usually low-ranking samurai (ashigaru) or commoner servants (chūgen). Owari, for example, rented a 
building at each station and had two domain agents per station conducting business.33   
The Kii official daimyō hikyaku couriers, who, like the Owari couriers were either low-ranking samurai or 
commoner servants, held a place in the popular imagination. Though low ranking in status, those who were strong, 
literate, and able to speak “officialese” with some fluency were selected to be transport office managers at one of the 
thirteen stations between Wakayama and Edo. They wore jackets fashioned with fierce dragon and tiger designs. 
They also carried swords and jitte, a metal rod used for capturing criminals. More than just managers arranging 
carriers, their duties included aiding the daimyō procession on alternate attendance, forwarding advance notice of 
the arrival of officials to stations to ensure that rooms for overnight stays and men and horses for transport were 
available, providing aid for difficult river and mountain crossings, reporting on natural disasters and transportation 
delays, and monitoring the roads branching off the main highways.34 In keeping with their police-like role, they 
were said to be notoriously domineering.35 
 
                                                            
28 Ninomiya Hisashi, Nihon no hikyaku-bin, (Osaka: Nihon Fuiraterikku Senta, 1987), 33.  These systems were known variously as ichi-ri tsugi, 
mura tsugi, or mura okuri—all indicating a village-to-village relay system that could be used by village headmen in official communications. 
29 Fujimura, Nihon no Kinsei, 315. 
30 Ibid., 316. 
31 Shashi, 32-33; Yūsei hyakunenshi, 18. 
32 Ibid., 33. 
33 Fujimura Junichirō, “Tōkaidō Bishū shichiri hikyaku ni tsuite,” Nihon Rekishi 475 (December 1987): 4. 
34 Fujimura, Nihon no Kinsei, 316-317. 
35 Ibid., 318. 
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The Emergence of Private Merchant Transporters 
        The courier system was in many cases a burden to the station in which the shichi-ri office was located. 
That station had to supply the runners or pay fees to acquire runners; managers in most cases did not carry letters or 
cargo themselves.36 The managers enjoyed considerable authority. In response to an investigation by the 
superintendent of transportation for the Tokugawa bakufu in 1843, the leaders of Futagawa station complained that 
the Owari shichi-ri agents demanded that runners be on duty to use at their pleasure without payment, that the 
village provide food and drink, and noted that the Owari agents rode in palanquins and stayed in inns free of charge. 
They put at risk, the village leaders reported, the continued existence of the station. A letter written just a month 
later repeated the claims and noted again with emphasis the evils brought about when shichi-ri managers gathered 
large groups (including vagrants) into the shichi-ri office for gambling.37 These abuses were hardly isolated. The 
village officials of Hodogaya had reported many of the same problems in 1777.38 
        The example of Owari demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining distinctions between official and 
commercial transportation. According to one report, in 1788, acting on rumors that merchants were abusing the 
special transport privileges for cheap or duty-free transport given to official cargo, bakufu officials called for the 
investigation of the Owari shichi-ri couriers. The investigation found that almost fifty crates of cargo entered Edo 
each month from Owari, but the amount of official documents and cargo included was nil. Merchants had been 
bribing transport managers to include commercial items. For a time thereafter, Owari was restricted to just five or 
six crates.39   
  By 1663 there were four commoner-operated courier houses in Osaka, three in Kyoto, and seven 
in Edo transporting goods between the three major cities of the Edo era.40 Most accounts trace the origins of these 
houses to the needs generated by the logistics of the Tokugawa bakufu. After finally consolidating its power with 
victories over the forces loyal to the heirs of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in Osaka (1615), Tokugawa officials assumed 
offices in Osaka Castle and Kyoto’s Nijō Castle. Although the bakufu had an official service for important goods 
and documents, officials in posts in Osaka and Kyoko were left to contrive their own means for communicating 
privately with family and others in Edo. The account from the official Meiji history of communications details the 
origins as follows: 
In [Genna 1 (1615)] the officials on duty in Osaka Castle conducted talks with the transport officials at all 
of the stations along the Tōkaidō highway and began sending their subordinates three times per month on the days 
with ‘eight’ [i.e. 8, 18th, 28th] to Edo and back. From this came the name sando bikyaku [thrice-monthly courier] 
and was the source of the interurban houses. Osaka merchants thereafter copied this system, making of it a 
[commoner] business; they operated under the guise of Osaka Castle servant, wearing the [low-ranking samurai’s] 
happi jacket and carrying two swords. By doing so, they avoided thieves on the roads.41  
In other words, at some point after 1615 Osaka merchants took over the delivery of officials’ personal 
mails, passing themselves off as low-ranking samurai and in the process gaining access to horses at reduced official 
                                                            
36 Fujimura, “Tsūshin to hikyaku,” 292. 
37 Komonjo ni miru Edo jidai no Futagawa-juku, in Futagawa-juku sōgō chōsa: bunken shiryō hen, edited by Watanabe Kazutoshi (Toyohashi-
shi: Toyohashi-shi Kyōikuiinkai, 1999), the investigation cited is Doc. 61, p. 208; the letter is Doc. 63, p. 222. 
38 Fujimura, “Tōkaidō Bishū shichiri hikyaku ni tsuite,” 3. 
39 Fujimura cites the travel account of Nakayama Ichinoshin from his Kōkan sensei tōyū manroku in “Tōkaidō Bishū shichiri hikyaku ni tsuite,” 
4. 
40 Hirooka Haruya, “Hikyakushō ni kansuru oboegaki: riku’un moto kaisha no keifu,” Unyu to keizai 17 (April 1957): 38.  Also,Yabuuchi, 33. 
41 Dai Nippon Teikoku ekitei shikō, ed. Aoe Shū (Tokyo: 1928 ed.), 143-144. 
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rates.42 Safety on the open road was surely a concern, but swords also gave to the commoner couriers an air of 
authority within the stations. Furthermore, the former Osaka official couriers had obtained the right to three horses at 
each station. The merchants, under their “official,” guise, continued to enjoy this right. Customarily, the hikyaku 
courier would ride one horse carrying letterboxes under official seal; the other two horses could be loaded with 
commercial goods.43 Finally, though it is unclear when all Osaka and Kyoto “thrice-monthly” duties were taken over 
by private merchants, by 1639 the non-official couriers were openly operating the sando-bikyaku.44 
        In the early years of the Tokugawa period the commercial centers of Osaka and Kyoto supplied much 
of the goods needed for Edo’s development. Merchants, including those who took over the private Osaka and Kyoto 
officials’ mails, began carrying correspondence on a regular basis for commoners as well.  If the records of the 
couriers that survived into the latter part of the Tokugawa period are accurate, the largest companies had seemingly 
humble beginnings: 
According to tradition, the Osaka couriers listed above [here omitted] little by little arrived in Edo [setting 
up shop in the locations given above] where they would place a mat on the ground in front of the shop and place the 
items posted [from Osaka and Kyoto]. People gathering there would pick up items addressed to them, make 
inquiries into and arrange for the next dispatch for Osaka and Kyoto, and return with their post. [Based on the time 
it took to travel] the couriers were called jō roku, or six-day couriers. Adding in the day of delivery to the courier, it 
took seven days, and later eight. Izumiya and Osakaya were tofu and vegetable merchants; Bizenya dealt in teacups. 
They expanded little by little, and at some point their sole business became transport.45 
 
From the beginning commerce and communications were closely connected. Those who would be 
expecting letters were most likely themselves transplanted merchants or subordinates on business from the Osaka 
and Kyoto region.  
        Indicative, too, of this growing connection between the needs of commerce and the growth of 
communications specialists was the emergence of the Osaka “thrice-monthly” courier houses as officially 
recognized companies.46 In 1663 the Osaka couriers who had been transporting for the Osaka Castle officials 
wearing the happi jackets of low-ranking foot soldiers and wearing swords, banded together to specialize in both 
commercial and official transport.47 They officially gave up the use of the names Osaka and Nijō Castle couriers the 
following year (1664), becoming recognized as “townsman” courier companies. Certainly, this move was spurred by 
the growing commercial economy.  
 Working in cooperation with couriers in Kyoto and Edo, the Osaka couriers took steps toward 
independence from their ambiguous role as Osaka Castle and Nijō Castle couriers in 1664. The couriers signed a 
yearly agreement with the Osaka and Kyoto bakufu offices to continue carrying officials’ private correspondence as 
before. For this they were given the right to three horses at stations (three or six, depending on the source). Tradition 
held that official correspondence would be placed in a box with the Osaka Castle magistrate’s seal and attached to 
the manager’s horse; the other two horses could be laden with merchant goods and letters. The Kyoto couriers 
                                                            
42 Yabuuchi Yoshihiko, “Kinsei kōtsū-tsūshin no tokushitsu ni tsuite: Tōkaidō shukueki ni okeru shojō teisō wo chūshin ni,” Rekishi Hyōron 141 
(May 1962): 50.  
43 Shashi,36. 
44 Ibid., 37. 
45 Ibid., 38.   
46 A fictionalized sando bikyaku (“thrice-monthly” couriers) house, the Kameya, provided much of the setting for one of Chikamatsu 
Monzaemon’s major plays, Meido no hikyaku (The Courier for Hell; first performed in 1711).  Chikamatsu Monzaemon, The Courier for Hell, 
Major Plays of Chikamatsu, trans. Donald Keene (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 162. 
47 Dai Nippon Teikoku ekitei shikō, 142; hereafter, Ekitei shikō. 
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handling Nijō Castle goods and letters carried a placard (efu) with the Nijō seal.48 Based on what was then judged to 
be the normal travel time between the western cities and Edo, they named their service the “guaranteed six-day 
mail” service, or jō roku.49 
     There were two Osaka groups, one of five houses and one of four, operating on the “thrice-monthly” 
principle. Contemporary guidebooks from 1679 describe the group of five as the “main courier” (hon-bikyaku) who 
originally took orders from Osaka Castle. Between the two groups there were at least eighteen shipments per month 
out of Osaka.50 In a testament to the growing needs for quick communications, bans on night travel, instituted in 
1639, were lifted for at least the Osaka sando-bikyaku couriers in 1712 with the proviso that they must have a 
written permit from Osaka and Sunpu (Shizuoka) Castle officials.51 In fact, the reforms may have been a nod to 
reality.  A separate source states that (in the years preceding 1712) the Kyoto, Osaka, and Sunpu couriers had been 
traveling at night (against regulations) and engaging in lawless behavior (furachi). Therefore night travel would be 
regulated by special permission from the Castle authorities.52  
 Merchants in the Kyoto-Ōmi region had extensive networks and had long been involved in 
transport. In keeping with its place as the political and cultural center of Japan, various courier routes existed 
between Kyoto and Osaka, Nara, Ōtsu, Tanba, Echizen, Nagasaki, Kaga, Ise, Himeji, Tsuruga, and Minō.53 The 
Kyoto Deputy (shoshidai) in 1619 charged bashaku (livery agents) with the job of supplying men and horses for the 
bakufu relay system on roads around Kyoto.54 By 1632 they were supplying only porters.55  Although positioned to 
expand their range, it seems that the traditional transport managers of the Kyoto capital did not develop into large-
scale operations with partnerships in the other metropolises. Though some of the bashaku were involved in 
developing long distance transport, this role seems to have been filled by merchants.56  These came to be known 
officially as the Kyoto junban hikyaku. 
         With the establishment of bakufu offices in Nijō Castle in Kyoto, private communications were 
transported between Kyoto and Osaka and Edo, first by foot soldiers, then by merchants acting as foot soldiers, and 
finally by merchants who had come into their own in the business of transport. Little is known about the early 
relations between the Kyoto transporters and the Nijō officials. The first recognition of the relations came much later 
when the Kyoto city commissioner, noting that the Kyoto couriers’ shipments were sent at irregular intervals, often 
avoiding inclement weather, organized sixteen houses into a guild. The following, from an Edo house, Kizuya, 
records the origins of the junban hikyaku from the first article of an appeal by those Kyoto houses in 1750: 
Concerning the guild of Kyoto couriers, until fifty-three years ago, the couriers undertook business each 
according to its own convenience. Because the couriers wouldn’t send shipments when there were too few parcels, 
inclement weather, or impassable rivers, it became a hindrance to [the Kyoto authorities’] business. Thus, fifty-two 
years ago in the seventh month of Genroku 7 (1694) the Kyoto city commissioners Andō (Tsugiyuki) Suruga no kami 
and Mizuno (Masanao) Bizen no kami ordered all the couriers to the commissioners’ office and after investigation 
named sixteen houses that would thereafter by arrangement dispatch a shipment every night in order without 
neglect so that official business would not be hindered.  In this regard, [the couriers] were put into the junban 
[rotating duty] guild and its members’ numbers registered. Accordingly, a nightly supervising house is designated, 
                                                            
48 Shashi, 43. 
49 Ekitei shikō, 183. Rare was the delivery that actually made the trip in six days. 
50 Shashi, 43. 
51 Ekitei shikō, ban on night travel. p. 168; permitted night travel, p. 220. 
52 Koji ruien, Hosokawa Junichirō, ed., (Tokyo: Jingu Shicho, 1896), vol. 19, p. 1329. 
53 Hirooka Haruya, “Hikyakushō ni kansuru oboegaki: riku’un moto kaisha no keifu,” 36. 
54 Koji ruien, vol. 19, p. 1328. 
55 Shashi, 31. 
56 Fujimura Junichirō, “Kinsei chūki Kyoto junban-bikyaku doiya no kenkyū,” Shigaku zasshi 74 (November 1965): 60. 
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and 5, 6, 7, or 8-day dispatches are variously shipped. The cooperating house in Edo is Jūshichiya Magobei of the 
second block of the Muromachi neighborhood, and [we] will perform our duties both to and from Edo without 
neglect.57 
Thus, in principle, sixteen Kyoto courier houses worked in conjunction with a single major Edo transport 
company, the Jūshichiya (“Seventeen” company).58 They conducted round trip carriage of items such as clothing for 
the shogun, daimyo houses, and temples and shrines.  They also handled official mail for Kyoto nobles and Nijō 
officials, as well as for commissioners and intendants in surrounding bakufu-controlled administrative districts. 
Included with the above were commercial items for merchant houses.59   
         The political and economic character of the three major cities seems to have shaped the character of 
communications to, from, and within each of them. Kyoto, as a major producer of silk textiles and clothing, had 
many transport companies that bypassed Edo, instead establishing trade routes with regions producing raw silk and 
other textiles such as Fujioka and Fukushima.60  By raw count, there were 43 courier houses in 1745; by 1810 there 
were 35.61 While this does not say anything about the volume of correspondence and cargo going in and out of 
Kyoto, it does speak to the tenuous nature of the transport business. The Kyoto guild seemed to be at a competitive 
disadvantage at stations on the road, finding that recognition from the Kyoto city commissioner was not the same as 
recognition from the shogunate itself.62 In the course of working in conjunction with other houses, financially 
weaker houses sometimes found themselves operating in name only, their debt held by the larger partner.  
        By the beginning of the Meiji era, several of the Edo courier houses had such extensive networks of 
regional offices that they were able to compete for a time with the newly established national postal service. The 
historical record favors the Edo houses: their house records provide much of the existing data on early modern 
communications organization. But as the above suggests, Kyoto and Osaka merchants who carried goods and letters 
themselves between the eastern and western cities originally started most of the big houses, and it was between these 
houses—west and east—that cooperative relationships were established. Nevertheless, by the second half of the 
Tokugawa period Edo was no longer primarily a “consumer” city, but also a producer of goods and culture in its 
own right. While the Edo couriers were the last to effectively organize a guild, they came to hold a position of 
prominence among the couriers of the three cities. 
        By the latter half of the seventeenth century merchant houses were specializing in communications, 
sending managers (sairyō), often with symbols of official authority, to arrange the relay of freight to packhorses 
along the way. Many of these courier houses developed through connections with textile merchants.63 Given the 
concentration of cotton textile merchants in Ōdenmachō transport area of Edo, perhaps it was natural that these 
merchants would develop transport operations of their own. A branch house (Shimaya Zaemon) of a wealthy Osaka 
merchant house with ties to the area began to specialize in transport for cotton merchants in 1671. Later, a group of 
12 houses joined together to cater to the needs of cotton goods merchants in Edo and Osaka, creating a kaisho (a 
central transport office used by all members) in both cities. In Edo the center of activities moved from Ōdenmachō 
                                                            
57 “Jō-bikyaku hattan kyūki,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, Hikyaku kankei shiryō, ed. Kodama Kōta (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1974), 
470-471.  This document purports to be a house history of the Kizuya written in 1840 based on the various records handed down by that house.  It 
seems to provide the basis for the general accounts found elsewhere in sources such as Shashi (p. 45, in this account Mizuno Masanao is given as 
“Echizen no kami”). 
58 The name “Jūshichiya” apparently derives from wordplay. The moon of the 17th night—jushichi (17) ya (night)--of the eighth month in the 
lunar calendar was called “tachimachitsuki,” which is a homophone for “instant arrival.” So dominant was Jūshichiya —at one time—that its 
name became synonymous for the term “hikyaku” (courier). Nihon kokugo daijiten, (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1974), vol. 10, p. 258. 
59 Shashi, 45. 
60 Fujimura, Nihon no Kinsei, 298. 
61 Fujimura, “Kinsei chūki Kyoto junban-bikyaku doiya no kenkyū,” 59. 
62 Shashi, 46. 
63 Hayashi Reiko, Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo: 1992), vol. 5, Shōnin no katsudō, 98. 
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to Setomonochō in 1701. The operation was overseen by the Shimaya Sōemon house, which became one of the 
major overland transporters throughout the Edo period. Significant activity by Edo-based couriers thus began in the 
commercially and culturally vibrant Genroku-Hō’ei era (1688-1710).64 
        In addition to goods, Edo transporters specialized in carrying cash, and advertised their services under 
the name “cash couriers” (kane-bikyaku).  They were also known as te-ita kane-bikyaku for their development of a 
system of cash transfers using a kind of registered mail with stamped receipts.65 Considering Chikamatsu’s use of 
cash shipments as a recognizable plot device in his play The Courier for Hell in 1711, the couriers who dealt in such 
a business must have been commonplace by the end of the Hō’ei era.66 
        The years of early growth were years of economic upheaval for the bakufu and various domain 
governments.  In the wake of fiscal instability and famine, the eighth shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune (1684-1751) 
instituted a series of measures commonly known as the Kyōhō reforms (known as such for the Kyōhō era—1716 to 
1735—in which they were instituted). Generally speaking, Yoshimune attempted to shrink government spending 
while encouraging development of taxable rice land. In shrinking government spending, he also cut back on 
government-operated transportation (as did domains such as Owari, which suspended domain courier operations). 
For the private courier houses this was a boom era of growth and competition. 
 
Toward Transport  Gui lds :  Struc tural  Constraints  on Communicat ions  
 Communications between Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto came to be dominated by a select number of 
private businesses by the late seventeenth century. Nonetheless, these hikyaku transporters only enjoyed limited 
official privilege. As seen above, the Kyoto companies had official backing from the Kyoto city commissioner, but 
the authority of that office was ambiguous at post stations along the five main highways. Other major companies had 
cultivated ties with individual domains, but this alone was insufficient to ensure survival. Still, the largest houses 
had in effect begun to behave as a trade association, fending off competition through cooperative tactics. 
 The competition among transporters began to intensify from the early eighteenth century, and this 
competition had the potential to revolutionize the nature of communications in the Tokugawa era through the 
introduction of high-speed relay transport. Around 1707, a mukumi transport company, Wakasaya (Wakasaya 
Chūemon), began cultivating clients along the Tōkaidō by operating a runner system  (kachi hikyaku).67 In 1719, 
Wakasaya Chūemon established eighteen independently operated horse transfer stations along the Tōkaidō between 
Shinagawa and Osaka and began express service. Freed from the need to await horses at the post station facilities 
used by other courier houses, Wakasaya Chūemon’s express business began to attract clients away from the 
established “thrice-monthly” group that had dominated communications.68 Around this time (though the exact dates 
are not clear) former employees from three “thrice-monthly” companies began operations on the Wakasaya model. 
When opportunity presented itself the established “thrice-monthly” houses joined ranks to petition for the 
prohibition of these independent operations.69 In 1743, an express courier for Wakasaya had letters containing cash 
stolen from him.  Because express couriers were particularly vulnerable to robbery, they were prohibited from 
                                                            
64Shashi, 47-48.    
65 “Shimaya Sōemon kasei roku,” in Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, Hikyaku kankei shiryō, ed. Kodama Kōta (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 
1974), 3-4.  One stamped paper (te-ita) followed the shipment and another was kept at the courier office; the remittee’s stamped proof of receipt 
would be forwarded back to the couriers’ offices. 
66 See note 36.  
67 Ekitei shikō, 226. 
68 The service was expensive: a three and a half day post was over 8 ryō, a four-day delivery cost just over 6 ryō. Ibid., 255. 
69 Yabuuchi, 36-37.  Shashi, 51-53. 
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carrying cash. As a result of their petition, the Edo city commissioners’ office issued a ban on these relatively new 
express operations in 1744.70 As a compromise, if determined that express letters faced delay along the roads, the 
road foreman was allowed at any post station to separate those letters and forward them ahead of the normal cargo 
by hiring runners for the purpose (nuki jō).71 
       In order to protect themselves and to limit competition the “thrice-monthly” carriers formed a quasi-
guild. Under the direction of Ōsakaya Mohei house, it set down a list of regulations (sadamegaki) in 1741 for its 
members to follow. Most noticeably, the agreement set down principles for the management of express mails. All 
were to be forwarded to a special office, the haya kaisho, and sent under the direction of Ōsakaya using the eighteen 
relay stations established by his “former” employee Kyūjirō, one of the upstarts mentioned above.72 This was, in 
effect, a power move on the part of Ōsakaya Mohei, facilitated by a favorable ruling in a case brought by Kyoto 
carriers against the Edo carriers two years earlier (the preamble to the regulations states that the ruling gave Ōsakaya 
Mohei the duty to set down the principles for the group).   
        An increasingly commercialized economy in the eighteenth century pushed the demand for more 
overland transport and faster communications. It was under these circumstances that the communications specialists 
in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto sought at the same time greater integration and protection while trying to develop new 
markets in the hinterland. Meanwhile, social dislocations seem to have resulted in large numbers of vagrants and 
bandits infesting even the most-traveled highways, creating greater need for government protection and intervention 
in matters of transport and communication. By the 1770s, conditions on the roads and at post stations had worsened 
considerably. This petition from 1773.11 lays out the problems facing the transporters and the measures they hoped 
the bakufu would take on their behalf: 
We humbly present the following request: 
Item: The nine [Edo] houses together humbly make this entreaty.  We have been transporting on behalf of 
the bakufu, its intendants, and the various lords, as well as providing for the private correspondence of samurai and 
the business correspondence of merchants since the Kan’ei era (1624-1643). We have received the official seals of 
Osaka and Nijō castles.  In the beginning a normal mail took 8 to 9 days [between that region and Edo]; an express 
delivery took 5 to 6 days. Nowadays, however, there are few horses, so we are temporarily detained at the post 
stations.  Currently, even if there are no obstructions at the rivers we may still wait up to 15 days to cross.  An 
express letter now takes 7 to 8 days, and a normal post takes as much as 20 to 30 days.  Because of these delays, the 
urgent business of bakufu intendants, officials, and even townsmen is being transmitted by their own servants.  Our 
business is dwindling and we are forced to send normal mails as express at great loss. Duty-free cargo sent under 
official seal naturally causes hardship at the stations, which try to make up the losses. We must pay fees in addition 
to the standard fees at each station. Moreover, we hear reports that along the roads, the grooms stop the horses and 
extort exorbitant “tips.” In this regard, we ask that yearly orders be issued so that along the Tōkaidō all hikyaku 
goods be expedited in the same manner as goods under official seal at all post stations and at river crossings.  The 
                                                            
70 Shashi, 53. 
71 “Jō-bikyaku hattan kyū ki,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, Hikyaku kankei shiryō, ed. Kodama Kōta (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1974), 
483.  Interestingly, at nearly the same time (1660) in London William Dockwra began a private penny post to fill a gap in the service of the Royal 
Post.  Until that time there had been no metropolitan service. Letters had to be picked up in person from the general post office. Though not in 
competition with the Royal post, which did not serve Londoners directly anyway, Dockwra’s popular service was perceived as a potential threat 
to the Duke of York, into whose coffers flowed revenue from the post. Dockwra’s efficient service was banned, but it did lead the post to initiate 
improvements in urban service.  But as with Japan, “improvement lagged behind public demand.” Howard Robinson, The British Post Office: a 
History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), 69. 
72 “Jō-bikyaku hattan kyū ki,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 477-482.  The house was known legally as Ōsakaya Mohei, though the 
comtemporary Mohei was yet in minority. His affairs were looked after by two others, Kan’emon and Heibei. 
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couriers will refrain from rude behavior and will pay all fees as has been the custom.  We pledge to an annual 
gratuity [myōgakin] of fifty ryō per member.73 
 
This appeal makes clear the contradictions in a transport system designed for military priorities but used 
predominantly for the transport of commercial goods. It also points to a growing problem of lawlessness in certain 
areas.74 Authorities appear to have had little inclination to impose reforms that might have reorganized 
communications more efficiently. For their part, transporters sought whatever protections and guarantees available 
under the Tokugawa political order. The unique political and economic conditions of the Tenmei period did much to 
strengthen the resolve of the commercial transporters to band together as an officially recognized guild in order to 
obtain privilege at stations and protection from encroachments by outside competitors.  
       Edo commercial couriers had periodically petitioned for official guild status since 1741. In the 1773 
appeal, the pledge to submit 50 ryō in exchange for aid in expediting transfers at stations, crossings at rivers, and 
ending illegal practices by porters and vagrants is indicative of the Edo carriers’ intentions. It was not until 1782, 
though, that they achieved their goal. That they became an officially licensed organization is perhaps not surprising; 
the years in which the Senior Councilor Tanuma Okitsugu exercised influence over bakufu efforts toward financial 
solvency (1767-1786) are remarkable for the rise of licensed merchant guilds.75 Unclear, however, is why the bakufu 
was slow in granting guild status to the transport companies.   
        The nine merchant houses that made up the Edo official carriers guild agreed to pay 100 ryō each in 
the inaugural year of the guild and 50 ryō per year thereafter. In exchange, they were allowed to use the word 
“designated” (jō) and were called thereafter jō-bikyaku. The bakufu was to send notice to stations that they were to 
handle jō-bikyaku freight as they would bakufu or daimyo official cargo and letters such that a transport manager 
with the jō-bikyaku seal could expect his freight to be transferred to the first available horses in the order that it 
arrived at a station.76   
       By the time these main merchant carriers had gained their long sought-after status, the character of the 
houses and their interrelations had changed. Many of the original petitioners from the 1740s were dead or retired. In 
the absence of the certainties that guild membership was presumably to ensure, most of the Edo merchant carriers 
had cultivated exclusive relations with powerful domains as official domain carriers. Shimaya, for example, was 
aligned with Mito, Jūshichiya with the officials of Kyoto’s Nijō Castle, Izumiya with the officials at Osaka Castle, 
and Ōsakaya with Kii domain.77   
       The two decades of the 1770s and 1780s were a time of repeated natural calamity for Japan, and this 
too had repercussions for the transport business. The eruption of Mount Asama in the northern Kanto region in 1783 
coupled with widespread crop failure that year caused thousands of deaths, particularly in northeastern Japan 
(Tōhoku). Crop failure in 1786 left yields at only one-third the yearly average, spreading famine and disease 
                                                            
73 “Jō-bikyaku hattan kyū ki,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 487-489. 
74 The records of the mukumi carriers contained in Kinsei kōtsū shiryō-shū, hikyaku kankei shiryō identify banditry and extortion as two 
continuing worries for the members of this guild. The area between Odawara and Edo, according to the records, was rife with groups that either 
threatened violence at stations if money was not “loaned,” or outright robbed the couriers, “Mukumi hikyakuya kyūki,” 66 and passim.  
75 John W. Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, 1719-1788: Forerunner of Modern Japan, Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1955), 80.  According to Hall, “[b]y 1780 Edo and Osaka each had over a hundred such associations….  All of these 
organizations paid to the government a yearly tax (unjō or myōga).  Although there was little uniformity in the rate of assessment, and few 
merchants were taxed systematically according to what they were able to pay, by mid-Tokugawa period the shogunate was adding appreciably to 
its income through this method of extracting revenue from the merchants.” 
76“Jō-bikyaku tonya negai-zumi ikken,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 497-498. 
77 Shashi, 76. 
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throughout the country.78 A characteristic of pre-industrial overland transport is its reliance on food sources for 
fuel. The Shimaya house noted in its records in Tenmei 6 (1786) that along the Tōkaidō the soybeans for horses had 
become expensive, the horses were sick, and the men suffering.79 Calculating the needs of soybeans and rice bran 
per horse, Shimaya contributed just over 405 ryō in gold and over six kan in silver for 4, 404 horses on both the 
Tōkaidō and Nakasendō highways; it also contributed funds to agents and others at stations with which it did 
business.80 Shimaya was positioned to weather the continued disasters, though. At that time it boasted of having a 
staff of 597 men and women across its network of offices.81 
       All of the nine Edo merchant carriers maintained relations with domains as official carriers. In this 
capacity, they were given the right to transport letters and freight under an official seal, which in many cases was 
affixed to a wooden placard (efu) accompanying the cargo. The placard alerted station transport officials that such 
cargo should be carried at a fixed low rate. The practice of granting duty-free or low-rate carriage to official (i.e. 
bakufu or domain) cargo was a strain on station finances in the best of times, but by the late eighteenth century it 
became a major source of contention between the station agents who sought to offset loses by high rates on travelers 
and commercial cargo and merchant carriers who sought any means available to reduce costs and hasten transfers at 
stations.82 
        Wielding symbols of authority in order to gain advantage at stations was hardly a new practice. The 
first Edo-era courier services operated under official title as couriers for Osaka and Nijō Castles. Merchant carriers 
went to great lengths to gain the privilege of using official symbols. For example, a carrier originally based in 
Kyoto, the Inokuchiya, gained the right to use the seal of Owari domain as a purveyor of services, but continued 
throughout the years of its service to petition for the right to bear swords. In 1736, a Niigata carrier was executed 
when his agent, who was shipping commercial goods, was discovered at Araima station on the Nakasendō highway 
using a counterfeit placard and illegally carrying swords. The merchant carrier’s head was sent back to Araima from 
Edo for display as a warning against fraudulent use of official seal and swords.83 It was in this atmosphere of 
increasing lawlessness on the roads and abuse of official privilege that an order banning the transport of excess 
cargo at night and the mixing of official and private letters and goods was issued in 1747.84 Bakufu and other official 
documents and cargo received first priority at stations. Not only was carriage free (or in some cases at guaranteed 
low fares), but also it was processed through stations before private cargo. Gaining equivalent treatment was a 
matter of business survival for the merchant houses.   
        Bakufu measures taken to curb abuses were not applied universally, however. For example, merchants 
from the Ōmi region near Kyoto had long-established business networks with towns and cities in the northern Kantō 
and the Tōhoku region (principally Fukushima, Yamagata, and Sendai). At first they concentrated on buying and 
selling silk thread and finished textiles, but as business increased they began to transport cargo as well. In 1725, Ōmi 
Hachiman merchants, who had already begun to assume the character of hikyaku, gained the right to use the official 
seal of the Sendai daimyo Ishikawa Yamato-no-kami and to bear swords. Later, after acting as transport agents for 
court noble Reizei Chūnagon and the Reizei princess to Sendai, the Ōmi Hachiman carriers returned the Sendai seal 
and became known as the Reizei group, and their cargo Reizei freight. One record of 1753 claimed that the “cargo 
of Hachirō’e [Hachiman hikyaku] was sent through the stations without ever even touching the ground.”85 Of course, 
                                                            
78 Hall, 122. 
79 “Shimaya Sōemon kasei roku,” Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 50. 
80 Shashi, 80. 
81 Ibid., 80. 
82 The contention between stations and carriers over petitions for rate increases by the former and abuse of official placards was a recurrent theme 
in hikyaku documents; a particularly good example can be found in “Efu nimotsu ōtai ikken,” in Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 227-291. 
83 Shashi, 67. 
84 Ekitei shikō, 264-265.  Shashi gives language from another official order for the same year strictly prohibiting the transport of commercial 
cargo under daimyo seal, 67. 
85 Hirooka Haruji gives a full account of the development of the Hachiman couriers, 37-38.  The date of 1753 is given in Shashi, 67. 
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the “Reizei freight” included not only the cargo of the court nobility, but also commercial goods handled by the Ōmi 
merchants. 
     The Edo merchant couriers naturally wanted to use symbols of their patrons’ power to ship commercial 
and official items together, and they petitioned for the right to do so.86 The implications of the request are worth 
noting. Had the Edo carriers been allowed to ship cargo at fixed low rates with other protections guaranteed under 
the guild license, they would have priority only below that of bakufu officials at stations in freight transfer and 
acquisition of man and horse. The policy might have been disastrous for the stations. The bakufu denied the request 
and continued to issue warnings against the mixing of commercial and official cargo; the first such order in 1751 
was followed by similar warnings in 1758 and 1776.87 
       The abuse of shipping commercial goods under official seal came to a head in 1799 when the transport 
agents for five stations in the Kyoto region sent a petition to the Kyoto city magistrate complaining of the hardships 
the carriers’ practices brought to their stations. Cargo traveling under the seals of Castle officials, court nobles, and 
the Houses of Mito, Kii, Owari, Hitotsubashi and others, they explained, had increased dramatically [through the 
Tenmei and Kansei years] while the amount of commercial cargo had fallen by half.88 It was in the transport of 
commercial goods that station agents hoped to make money—at least enough to help underwrite the duty of 
transporting official freight. The loss of horses and able-bodied porters in the stark Tenmei years was a critical issue: 
for the merchant carriers it made the use of official seals an imperative; for the stations any such abuse of the system 
exacerbated an already difficult situation.89 In this case it was not the Edo merchant houses, but rather their Kyoto 
counterparts who were the defendants in the suit. After a ten-month investigation fifty-nine persons attached to the 
Kyoto businesses were punished. Thirteen were banished from residence in Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, Nara, 
Fushimi, Nagasaki, Nagoya, Wakayama, and Mito, banned from using the main highways, had their properties 
confiscated, and were fined. Thirty-four were sentenced to public display in handcuffs; the remainder received lesser 
punishments (a note at the end of the document explains that the verdicts were not sent down until the third year, 
1802).90  
        Responding to the pressures for reform, the next year (1803) the Edo carriers’ guild, under the 
direction of Osakaya Mohei, established new procedures and bylaws in two sets of documents, signaling a move 
toward greater internal cooperation.91 A document in fifty-three articles covered procedures for selecting officers, 
processes and schedules for the different kinds of mails (including a template for delivery certification), costs of 
mails based on weight and kind, and the like. They also delineated the carriers’ duty to inform authorities in case of 
civil disturbance, natural disaster, impassable rivers, and the like.92 The thirty articles of the bylaws, recorded by the 
other leading house, Shimaya, were prescriptive in tone. They enjoined the guild members to uphold guild rules and 
to refrain from the kind of competitive practices that had undermined the guild in the past. 
         By 1793 merchant carriers in Osaka, Kyoto, Fushimi, as well as the 194 members of the Edo mukumi 
transporters, had received official recognition as guilds. In turn, each group issued templates of guild certification 
documents that were attached to cargo so that shipments could be verified, and also to curtail abusive practices by 
couriers (whose names would be on the certifications).93 In theory then, the guilds could expect that their cargo 
would be carried between stations in the order it was sent, and that they would not have to wait for days at certain 
                                                            
86 Shashi, 75. 
87 “Efu nimotsu ikken issatsu hikae,” in Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 398. 
88 “Shokō go-efu ikken todome,” in Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 292-293. 
89 Ibid., 292. 
90 Ibid., 307-310. 
91 Shashi, 84. 
92 “Nakama shihō-chō,” in Kinsei kōtsū-shi shiryō, vol. 7, 345-365; “Nakama jōhō-chō,” in ibid, 366-384.  
93 Shashi, 84. 
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stations while other transporters received preferential treatment. The Edo mukumi hikyaku had, for the most part, 
defined themselves as cargo carriers for the daimyo, particularly on occasions of alternate attendance.  In this way, 
they did not encroach on the business of the Edo merchant couriers. For a brief period at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the merchant couriers seemed to be prospering.94 
        The problems that guild organization was to have solved—delays at stations due to insufficient horses 
and men, and abuses by station transport agents—seem to have again worsened by the late 1820s. In 1830 the guild 
petitioned the Commissioner of Highways complaining that stations had reverted to pre-Tenmei conditions: there 
were few horses and two to three-day delays at each station was once again the norm; transport agents and their 
subordinates were demanding gratuities to expedite transfers; and violent extortions by porters were on the rise. In 
short, the Edo merchant carriers asked that an order once again be sent to stations reminding them that because 
merchant cargo contained official goods and letters it was to be treated in the same manner as goods traveling under 
official seal. The bakufu sent the order, but apparently to little effect.95 
 
Dissolution and Reorganization of Transport Guilds: Toward Company 
Integration 
        The Tenpō years (1830-1844) saw successive crop failures and famine that recalled for many the 
devastation of the Tenmei era. While the crop failures of the Tenmei era had been the worst in the northern regions 
of Honshū, those of the Tenpō era were extended into the southern regions of the main island.96 The effects on 
transporters were much the same as they had been fifty years before. Grain for horses was in short supply or 
nonexistent, and lawlessness on the roads increased with an influx of desperate people in search of sustenance. In 
1838 the carriers and their managers took it upon themselves to work out compromises with each station and sent 
representatives along the Tōkaidō for that purpose. The next year they worked out a plan to set aside ten percent of 
fees (gojō moto dachinsen) to be paid out to the stations. In exchange, the stations would restore order to shipping 
and transfers and control unruly porters.97 
        It was in the context of the Tenpō calamities that the bakufu—as well as many individual domains—
began to undertake a series of economic and social reforms (known collectively as the Tenpō Reforms). Some 
measures, such as prohibitions against luxurious clothing and extravagant behavior, were aimed at stopping wasteful 
practices among commoners. Others, such as attempts to stop migrants from entering Edo and to return those living 
in Edo to their native homes, were meant to relieve strains on the bakufu budget and to encourage commoners to 
increase the tax base through a return to farming. The bakufu also attempted to wrest control of commerce from the 
guilds, banning guilds in 1841.. The “six associations” (mukumi) transporters’ guild was dissolved in Tenpō 12.12 
(early 1842); the Edo private merchant couriers’ guild was dissolved in Tenpō 13.6 (1842).   
        Recognizing that the dissolution of the guilds had not achieved their intended results, the bakufu lifted 
the bans in 1852, and courier guilds were quickly reorganized. Few records exist indicating what became of the 
couriers after the Tenpō reforms, but the decree recognizing the reorganization of the guild lists five members: 
Kyōya Yohei, Yamadaya Hachizaemon, Shimaya Sōemon, Izumiya Jinbei, and a new member, Edoya Jinzaburō. 
While the number of large transport companies in Edo, at least, dwindled, the need for communications did not flag. 
                                                            
94 Ibid., 89. 
95 Ibid., 91-92. 
96 Harold Bolitho, “The Tempō Crisis,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988),  117-119. 
97 Shashi,92. 
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If anything, the opening of Japan by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 and the subsequent opening of Yokohama 
and other ports to foreign trade after 1859 only spurred the need for greater integration of communications networks.      
 
Conclusion 
 In 1871 the fledgling Meiji government announced plans to create a national postal system. Here 
is the announcement as it appeared in English-language newspapers of the day: 
It is of greatest importance for public and private objects to facilitate as far as possible communication by 
post. Hitherto this service has been entirely left to private enterprise, so that great delay has frequently occurred in 
the transmission of letters. Sometimes it has required more than ten days for a letter to arrive at a distance of a 
hundred miles or so, while in other cases there was fear that letters never reached their destination at all.  The 
charge for letters required to be forwarded with expedition has been very high, and the poorer classes in remote 
parts of the country have been entirely shut out from mutual intercourse.  From the difficulty of learning the 
condition of affairs and the market prices of produce in different parts, it has often happened that groundless 
rumors have been spread abroad, and the public mind has been misled thereby. The knowledge of these facts has 
excited our profoundest commiseration. 
   It is therefore our intention gradually to inaugurate a general system of Posts on all the high-roads of the 
Empire, so that there may be inter-communication of thought between the remote points, and the state of affairs 
throughout the country be ascertained with ease and quickness, so that all classes may be able to have their letters 
forwarded with the greatest possible expedition. 98  
 
The Meiji government took pains to make a distinction between the purposes of the national postal system 
it proposed and the practices of the Tokugawa era, which were blamed for keeping Japanese in a state of mutual 
isolation. This study makes clear, however, that the complex and uneven state of communications in Tokugawa 
Japan had as much to do with the development of commercial relations, political organization, and infrastructure as 
it did with the practices of the private courier houses. The merchant couriers of the large cities, as we have seen, 
were operating over a dual-purpose transportation system that privileged the needs of the authorities over other 
users. By extension, then, official communications took priority over private and commercial letters and freight. 
Fast, efficient service is presumably the lifeblood of the communications trade, but under the conditions of the 
Tokugawa period it was difficult to provide efficient communications even under the best of circumstances. Laws 
commanded that freight be transferred from horse to horse at each station. The station agents, after handling the 
needs of official transporters, were to accommodate other travelers and transporters in the order they arrived. The 
stations were to offset financial strain placed on them through the fees paid by regular travelers; the couriers made 
their money by keeping transport expenses as low as possible.  As a result, the couriers consistently abused the seals 
and emblems that allowed for low-rate or duty-free horse and manpower by intermingling commercial and official 
letters and items. 
                                                            
98 “A Japanese Post Office,” The Japan Weekly Mail, 29 April 1871.  The Japanese version maybe found at Yūseishō, Yūsei hyakunenshi nenpyō 
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1972), 8. 
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 While there is as yet no conclusive evidence, it is possible that the abolition of guilds as part of the 
Tenpō reforms hurt some couriers and aided others as opportunities to expand clientele at the expense of other 
couriers presented themselves.  In addition, as interregional commercial activities intensified, so too did the need for 
more extensive communications networks. Thus, in spite of the political upheavals of the 1850s and 1860s, and 
despite continuing problems at the post stations, the urban couriers that had survived had developed cooperative 
networks that connected castle towns and regional commercial centers.   
        Even as transport was fragmented and disrupted by the events of the Meiji Restoration, the merchant 
couriers continued to provide their services. Communications officials in the new Meiji government were aware of 
the need for reform, but even among those who knew of Western postal systems, none had the expertise or practical 
experience to implement such a system. At the same time, practices and relationships among those long involved in 
transport held fast. If merchants with interregional business could manage their communications with confidence 
through existing arrangements there was little incentive for them to use the new post unless it could improve on the 
service of the hikyakuya couriers. The hikyakuya, seeing their businesses threatened by the new post, responded to 
the threat by lowering prices. For a short time in the early Meiji period the survival of the new national post was in 
jeopardy. Finally, Maejima Hisoka was able to convince the couriers to reestablish themselves as specialists in 
parcel transport and as subsidized transport agents of the Japanese postal system. 
 Nittsū’s company history provides an essential and compelling picture of overland 
communications in the Tokugawa, but the story is incomplete. There is still much work to be done to fully 
understand how the merchant couriers managed their businesses, how they coordinated with other regional 
companies, and whether and to what extent maritime and overland communications were integrated before the Meiji 
period. These questions and more remain, but like the fictional character Hanzō of Before the Dawn, we find that 
little-noticed shifts in communications brought dramatic changes to Japanese society as it became increasingly 
connected to the rest of the world. 
  Glossary 
bashaku    ?? 
chijimi hikyaku   ??? 
efu    ??–?? 
hikyakuya   ??? 
hyō    ? 
Izumiya    ??? 
jitte    ?? 
jō-bako    ?? 
jō-bikyaku   ??? 
junban-hikyaku   ???? 
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Jūshichiya   ??? 
kachi metsuke   ???? 
koku    ? 
kome hikyaku   ??? 
kane-bikyaku (hikyaku)  ??? 
Kōshū    ?? 
machi bugyō   ??? 
mukoku    ?? 
mukumi hikyaku   ???? 
mura tsugi   ??–?? 
mura okuri   ?? 
myōgakin   ??? 
Naikoku Tsūun Kaisha  ?????? 
Nakasendō   ???–??? 
Nikkō    ?? 
nuki-jō    ??–?? 
Ōshū    ?? 
Reizei Chūnagon   ????? 
ri    ? 
Riku’un Moto Gaisha  ????? 
rōjū    ?? 
sadamegaki   ?? 
sairyō    ??–?? 
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sando-bikyaku   ???? 
sankin kōtai   ???? 
shichi-ri hikyaku   ???? 
shōhō kaisho   ???? 
shoshidai   ??? 
te-ita    ?? 
tenma yaku   ??? 
Tōkaidō    ??? 
tonya (toiya)   ?? 
tsugi-bikyaku   ???–??? 
Yoake mae   ?????? 
